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FRAUD CASES IN THE TAX COURT
BY RICHARD Z. STEINHAUS*
Tax evasion is considered most popular in the order of economic crimes
of the twentieth century, for it is available to each of the 65 million taxpayers.
Unlike bankruptcy and mail or stock fraud, tax evasion always carries with it
allied civil sanctions providing for assessment and collection of taxes with
severe penalties added. In referring to the civil penalties as remedial sanctions
imposed in addition to the tax, the Supreme Court has said, "They are
provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to
reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the
loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud."' The fifty-per-cent fraud penalty
provided by section 6653(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is actually
quasi-criminal in nature as the Government must prove the taxpayer's fraud.2
While a civil fraud case may result from criminal tax evasion, proof of
that crime is not always the occasion for civil fraud action by the Internal
Revenue Service. Many times, because of the different burden of proof and
related factors, there is a successful assertion of the civil fraud penalty where
there has been no criminal case prosecuted or where, in fact, a criminal
prosecution by the Government has been unsuccessful. During the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1962, there were 10,229 preliminary investigations for fraud
by the IRS. Of these, 3,469 were full-scale investigations, out of which 1,341
resulted in recommendations of "no prosecution," and 2,128 resulted in
recommendations for prosecution. Income tax fraud cases numbered 955 while
the others were concerned with wagering, coin-operated gaming devices,
and other miscellaneous Internal Revenue violations. During the fiscal year
1962 there were 7,681 indictments and informations obtained in the federal
courts; 5,263 of these resulted in pleas of guilty or nolo contendere; 866 were
tried and convicted while 402 were acquitted. The other 760 cases were
dropped for various reasons.3
ORIGINATION OF A CIVIL TAX FRAUD CASE
Every tax case, civil or criminal, starts at the audit level. In any examina-
tion where fraud is suspected, the examining revenue agent making the
* B.S., 1951, New York University; LL.B., 1955, Brooklyn Law School; member,
New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7454(a). The fact that the Government has the burden
of proving fraud in a civil tax fraud case must be kept constantly in mind as this is
the reverse of the situation in the ordinary civil tax case where the Commissioner's
determination is presumed to be correct; it resembles a criminal tax case except that
the burden is prescribed by the statute.
3. FY 1962 COMM'R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 33.
f25
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
audit will refer the case to a special agent of the Service's Intelligence
Division. It is this special agent's task to determine whether or not the
facts of the case warrant a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Either
the special agent or the revenue agent, however, can recommend the asser-
tion of a civil fraud penalty. Assuming no prosecution has been recom-
mended at the conclusion of the audit, the revenue agent will notify the
taxpayer of any asserted deficiencies and attempt to secure an agreement as
to these deficiencies. If no agreement is secured, the taxpayer will usually be
sent a "10-day letter" by the district director notifying him of the deficiency
and the reasons therefor. 4 The taxpayer is given ten days from the date of
the letter to request an informal conference with the Service to discuss the
proposed adjustments with an impartial conference co-ordinator. The taxpayer
is always entitled to be represented by an attorney or other duly qualified
agent who is the holder of a treasury card entitling him to practice before
the IRS. 5 If a representative is chosen, however, the taxpayer must execute
a power of attorney giving his representative power to negotiate for him
unless the taxpayer appears with his representative in person.6 If the tax-
payer wishes, upon receipt of the ten-day letter, he can execute form 870
and agree to the deficiency and penalties asserted against him. This precludes
any appeal to the Tax Court.
If the informal conference is declined or no agreement is reached at the
conference, a thirty-day letter will be issued by the Service. Along with the
thirty-day letter the taxpayer will receive the revenue agent's examination
report explaining the proposed adjustments. The taxpayer may then file a
protest with the district director, which will enable his case to be referred to
the Appellate Division of the Internal Revenue Service for further considera-
tion. The protest is submitted within thirty days of the receipt of the district
director's notice and should enumerate the items to which the taxpayer takes
exception, together with the facts on which the taxpayer relies for his protest.
7
The hearings before the Appellate Division are informal, and no testimony is
usually taken; however, the technical advisors who hear the case may request
supporting data and documentation from the taxpayer to support his con-
tentions. Briefs setting forth the law relied upon by the taxpayer are also
considered by the Appellate Division.
If no agreement is reached in the Appellate Division, or if the taxpayer
elects to waive the filing of a protest, a ninety-day letter, called a statutory
notice of deficiency, will be issued.8 Upon receipt of this notice, the taxpayer
4. 26 C.F.R. § 601.105(c) (1961).
5. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (1959) (requirements to practice).
6. 26 C.F.R. § 601.503 (1961).
7. 26 C.F.R. § 601.105 (1961).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6212.
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has four alternatives. (1) He can execute form 870 and pay the deficiency.
(2) He can allow the ninety days to toll and pay the deficiency upon billing.
(3) After payment, he can bring suit for refund in either a United States
district court 9 or the United States Court of Claims. (4) He can file a petition
with the Tax Court within the allotted ninety days.' 0 This Article deals with
the fourth alternative.
Once a case is within the jurisdiction of the Tax Court, settlement can
only be obtained with the agreement of the Appellate Division and the
regional counsel who represents the Commissioner.1 1 Jurisdiction over the
case for settlement purposes passes exclusively to the regional counsel on
the calendar call in the session of the Tax Court.
12
A taxpayer may be involuntarily required to pay over a deficiency and
related penalties prior to the trial of the case in the Tax Court. This occurs
where the district director believes that the assessment or collection of the
deficiency will be jeopardized by delay, and he acts under the authority of
section 6861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This section, however,
requires that the notice of deficiency must be issued within sixty days of the
jeopardy assessment. A taxpayer may stay collection by filing a bond with
the district director in an amount at least equal to the deficiencies and penalties
assessed in the notice of assessment. 13 After a jeopardy assessment, however,
the Tax Court will retain jurisdiction to determine the proper amount of
deficiency and penalties, if any. 14
Section 6653 (b) under which the civil fraud penalty is asserted provides,
"That there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 50% of the under-
payment." "Underpayment" is the amount of the deficiency reflected from a
comparison of the taxpayer's original return, if any was filed, with the statu-
tory notice of deficiency.' 5 This definition precludes the reduction of a
penalty by filing an amended return prior to or after the statutory notice of
deficiency. 16 Thus, a penalty may be asserted at the time of the issuance of
the deficiency notice, although there is no tax due at that time.
9. Although the district court offers a jury trial on factual issues, this is not
always an advantage in a tax-fraud case because of the complexity of the issues;
furthermore, many taxpayers forego any advantage the district court might afford because
of the requirement that the deficiency be paid first. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6512(a).
Thus, the Tax Court is the forum chosen in the great majority of civil fraud cases.
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213.
11. 26 C.F.R. § 601.106 (1961).
12. 26 C.F.R. § 601.106 (1961).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6863(a).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6863(b)2.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6653(c).
16. For cases under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to the same effect, see
Middleton v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1952); Herbert Eck, 16 T.C. 511
(1951), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1953).
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THE TAX COURT
The Tax Court is a forum of limited jurisdiction. It can only sit on
matters related to income, estate, gift, and excess profits taxes, where a
statutory notice of deficiency is mailed to the taxpayer and the taxpayer duly
files a petition with it within the ninety-day period provided.17 The Tax
Court was formerly known as the Board of Tax Appeals and was organized
under a 1924 act.18 It was formed to serve as an independent forum in which
a taxpayer could litigate deficiencies asserted against him without first having
to pay them. Prior to the act of 1924, the only remedy the taxpayer had
without paying the deficiency was an appeal to the Commissioner on Appeals
and Reviews before his assessment. This was not an independent agency but
was an integral part of the IRS. The Board of Tax Appeals satisfied the
need for an independent forum. It was, and still is, an agency of the executive
branch of the Government, and not part of the judicial structure. 19 Its func-
tions are, however, formal and judicial in character, and all the rules of
courtroom etiquette and evidence apply at its trials. One of the disadvantages
under the 1924 act was that no direct appeal could be made from a decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals to a court of appeals. If the taxpayer lost, the
only remedy was a refund suit in a federal district court after the payment
of the tax and penalties due. The 1926 act remedied this deficiency and pro-
vided for direct appeal to the circuit court of appeals or the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. In 1942 the Board of Tax Appeals was re-named
the Tax Court of the United States.
The Tax Court is made up of sixteen judges with one acting as Chief
Judge. All the judges are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. They serve for a period of twelve years or less if
they are appointed to complete an unexpired term.20 The Tax Court's pro-
ceedings are conducted with the custom, dignity, and procedure of a court
of law. One judge presides over each proceeding. The Tax Court provides
its own rules of practice and procedure.2 ' The rules of evidence applicable in
trials without a jury in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia will apply in the Tax Court.22 All evidence received by the Tax
Court becomes public record. Its principal office is in Washington, D.C., but
it may hear cases at any place within the United States where there are
suitable accommodations available and where there is a sufficient number of
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6512. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7442 gives jurisdic-
tion over excess profits taxes.
18. Revenue Act of 1924, Ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336.
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7441.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7443.
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7453.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7453.
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cases ready for hearing.23 The Tax Court provides a list of cities where the
hearings are periodically held. Motions are generally heard in Washington
on Wednesdays unless the taxpayer can show by motion good cause for holding
the hearing elsewhere.
2 4
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that no one duly qualified
shall be denied the right to practice before the Tax Court ;25 however, attorneys
and others must first apply for admission. Attorneys are admitted on motion
while certified public accountants and others must take a written examination
to qualify.
PLEADINGS
The filing by the taxpayer of a petition within ninety days of the receipt
of the statutory notice of deficiency invokes the jurisdiction of the court.2 6
Under the rules of the Tax Court a petition must contain a clear and concise
statement of each and every error which the taxpayer alleges the Commissioner
committed in determining the deficiency.27 The taxpayer thereafter becomes
the petitioner and the Commissioner becomes the respondent. Any affirmative
defenses of the petitioner, such as the statute of limitations, should be pleaded
in the petition.
The answer must be filed by the Commissioner within sixty days of the
service of the petition. 28 Any motion made pertaining to the petition by the
Commissioner must be filed within forty-five days of the service of the
petition.2 9 If he seeks the fraud penalty, the Commissioner must allege fraud
as an affirmative allegation in his answer.3 0 The answer should contain a
specific admission or denial of each and every allegation of fact contained in
the petition and a statement of the facts on which the Commissioner will rely
in his defense of the affirmative allegations. The petitioner is thus on notice
of the nature of the Commissioner's defense.
The petitioner must reply to the answer where there are affirmative
allegations made by the Commissioner. Failure to do so results in petitioner's
admission of the allegations.3 ' The petitioner has forty-five days after service
upon him of the answer in which to file a reply or thirty days within which
to move with respect to the answer.3 2 The reply, like the answer, should
contain a specific admission or denial of each material allegation of fact
23. TAX CT. R. PRcc. 26.
24. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 27.
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7452.
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6512(a).
27. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 7.
28. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 14.
29. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 14.
30. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 14.
31. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 18.
32. TAX CT. R. PRAd. 15.
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contained in the prior pleading, and it should in addition set forth any facts
upon which the petitioner relies for a defense thereto.
The rules of the Tax Court provide that the petitioner may amend his
petition any time before the answer without leave of court.33 To amend after
service of the answer, the petitioner must get the consent of the Commissioner
or leave of the court by motion.a4 There is no specific rule as to amendments
of the answer by the Commissioner, but the courts have held that the Com-
missioner may amend his answer at any time.a
5
PRE-TRIAL AND DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
Discovery procedures are not employed as extensively in the litigation
before the Tax Court as they are in other civil cases, because the facts are
usually within the knowledge of the petitioner and because the Commissioner
usually obtains his information before the Tax Court obtains jurisdiction.
Certain devices are used, however. An important weapon in the hands of the
petitioner in a fraud case is the motion for a further and better statement. 36
When the Commissioner makes a general allegation of fraud in his answer, the
petitioner can make use of this motion to have the basis of the allegation of
fraud explained so he can properly prepare his defense.
The rules of the Tax Court also provide for the taking of depositions
upon oral examination3 7 and upon written interrogatory.3 8 Application for
such depositions must be filed at least thirty days prior to the date set for
the trial of the case.3 9 Such depositions must be filed with the court at
least ten days prior to the trial. 40 Depositions are often used where a witness
will not be available to testify at the trial or where a witness is located far
from the place of trial and the cost of his physical presence would be pro-
hibitive. Under the rules of the court, depositions desired of witnesses in
foreign countries must in most cases be taken by written interrogatory. 41
These interrogatories are forwarded directly to the court after they have been
transcribed and sealed.
A new procedure effective June 1, 1963, is the rule 28 pre-trial con-
ference.42 Either party in a case on a trial calendar may move for a pre-trial
conference, or the trial judge on his own motion may require a pre-trial
33. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 17.
34. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 17.
35. Henningsen v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1957); Helvering v.
Edison Sec. Corp., 78 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1935) ; Saul Schlenoff, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1057 (1954).
36. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 17(c).
37. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 45.
38. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 46.
39. TAX Cr. R. PRAc. 45(b).
40. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 45(b).
41. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 46(d).
42. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 28.
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conference. Also, prior to the listing of a case for trial, the Chief Judge, upon
his own motion or that of either party, may place the case upon the next
calendar in the taxpayer's city for a pre-trial conference. Pre-trial conferences
will be held where there is a possibility of narrowing the issues, stipulating
the facts, simplifying the presentation of evidence, or otherwise assisting in
the preparation for trial or other disposition of the case without the necessity
of a trial on all the issues. A request for pre-trial conference may be made
orally at the calendar call or by written motion with the Tax Court in
Washington, and should include a statement of the reason for the request.
The rules of the Tax Court state that the pre-trial conference will not
be held as a substitute for the conferences required between the parties to
enable a stipulation of facts to be presented to the court. Under the rules
of the Tax Court the parties, prior to the trial, are required to get together
in order to enter into a stipulation of facts. The rules provide that "The Court
expects the parties to stipulate evidence to the fullest extent to which complete
or qualified agreement can be reached including all material facts that ar
not or fairly should not be in dispute."'43 A penalty is provided if a party fails
to confer with his adversary in order to stipulate the facts which are not in-
dispute.
44
Before trial, Service procedure dictates that the Appellate Division shall
make a final effort to dispose of-the case by settlement. This can be accom-
plished by means of the pre-trial conference.4 5 (This conference should not
be confused with the pretrial conference called for under rule 28 of the
Tax Court Rules of Practice.) Across the conference table respondent's
and petitioner's counsel can together assess the merits of their respective
causes. The technical advisor of the Appellate Division staff, because
of his greater experience at this time with the case file, generally conducts
the conference. The special attorney of the regional counsel's staff has pre-
viously had a hand in the preparation of the statutory notice of deficiency, and
he here acts to enforce the deficiency claim for the Appellate Division. If no
settlement appears likely at this conference, a general discussion as to trial
problems and stipulation possibilities will usually occur between counsel. If a
settlement is likely, further conferences will explore its possibilities.
About six months prior to trial, the court issues a trial status request
to both respondent and petitioner. Such request indicates a proposed session
date and seeks the advice of the parties as to their readiness, estimated time of
43. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 31(b) (1).
44. TAX CT. R. PRAc. 31(b) (1). Upon motion of the opposing party, facts and
evidence in possession of a dilatory party may be considered established for purposes of
the case.
45. Rev. Proc. 60-18, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 988. This ruling outlines conference
procedure, which should in all cases be consulted by petitioner's counsel prior to the
pre-trial conference.
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trial, and possibility of settlement. This advice enables the clerk of the court
to prepare the calendars well in advance of the trial. Notice that their case
has been set for trial is sent to the parties at least ninety days prior to the
session of the court.40 During this last ninety-day period, as the parties prepare
their cases, pressure develops for further stipulation of facts. It is also at this
time, when trial is imminent, that a final evaluation-more often than not-
produces settlement. Under current procedures, however, settlement at this
stage is becoming increasingly unlikely, and the wise practitioner will not
wait this long to propose a settlement.
THE TRIAL
Calendar call usually fills the courtroom with counsel for petitioners and
respondent, and as each case is called the judge will request an estimate by
the parties as to the time required to try their case. The respondent in fraud
cases has the burden of proving the fraud and will usually require more time
than the petitioner. Frequently, many witnesses are present, appearing under
subpoenas which are ordinarily dated for the calendar call.
The court on this day is invariably presented with requests for con-
tinuances, which are almost always opposed by the respondent (although on
occasion he is the moving party). Such continuances are, however, granted
reluctantly and only for good cause. Conflicting engagements or employment
of new counsel is not regarded as "good cause."
Upon the call of the case, opening statements by both parties setting
forth the facts they intend to prove and the law upon which they will rely
are heard. Although normally the petitioner presents his evidence first, in
fraud cases it is not unusual for the Commissioner to present his case first.
The determining factor is, which party has the burden of proof. The Tax
Court Rules of Practice state, "The burden of proof shall be upon the
petitioner, except as otherwise provided by statute, and except that in respect
of any new matter pleaded in his answer, it shall be upon the respondent."
4 7
By statute where the issue is whether or not the petitioner is guilty of fraud
with intent to evade taxes, the burden of proof is upon the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.4 8 This provision does not always govern who will
present his case first, however, because the burden as to proving the defi-
ciency erroneous is on the petitioner even where a fraud penalty is asserted.4 9
The statute of limitations plays an important part in determining which
party has the burden of proving or disproving an alleged deficiency. The
46. TAX CT. R. PRmc. 27(b) (I).
47. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 32.
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7454(a).
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7422(e).
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time within which deficiencies must be assessed is three years from the
last day the return is due,50 but the period is extended to six years where
the Commissioner can prove that the taxpayer understated his gross income
by twenty-five per cent or more for the year in question. 51 Where the
Commissioner can prove a fraudulent evasion of income tax by a taxpayer
there is no statute of limitations as to assessments of deficiencies. 52 Thus, if
the Commissioner asserts a deficiency for any year that would be foreclosed
by the three-year statute of limitations, he has the burden of proving the
six-year statute of limitations applies 58 or, where he asserts fraud, that there
is no limitation for time of assessment. 54 In such cases the Commissioner is
required to present his evidence first, because if the Commissioner does not
carry his burden on this point by "clear and convincing evidence," 5 5 there will
be no issue as to the deficiency itself. Where some of the deficiencies assessed
are restricted by the three-year statute of limitations and others are not, it is
within the judge's discretion to determine whether petitioner or respondent
will first present evidence.
56
To sustain the burden of proof as to fraud, the Commissioner must prove
that there was an underpayment of tax according to the Internal Revenue
Code 57 and that some part of this underpayment was due to wilful, fraudulent
evasion. 58 A deficiency paid by filing an amended return after the due date
may still be considered an underpayment for purposes of assessment of a
fraud penalty. 59 The issue of whether or not a taxpayer is "guilty of fraud
with intent to evade taxes" is primarily a question of fact.60 The Tax Court
examines all of the facts presented by both sides in determining this issue.
The Commissioner must prove fraud by "clear and convincing evidence." 61
This is less than the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" required in a
criminal tax evasion case,62 but more than the normal burden in civil cases of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Commissioner's burden has
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (a).
51. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (e).
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(c).
53. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7422(e).
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7454(a).
55. Klassie v. United States, 289 F.2d 96, 101-(1961).
56. Id. at 100.
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6653(c).
58. TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6653(b).
59. See Middleton v. Commissioner, 00 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1952); Herbert Eck,
16 T.C. 517 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1953).
60. Klassie v. United States, 289 F.2d 96, 101 (1961).
61. See United States v. Thompson, 279 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1960); Rea M. Gano,
19 B.T.A. 518 (1930).
62. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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been set forth time and again in the opinions of the Tax Court and in those
of higher courts.13 Judge Drennen of the Tax Court recently held,
A charge of fraud has always been regarded as a serious matter
in the law. Not only is it never presumed, but the ordinary pre-
ponderance of evidence is not sufficient to establish such a charge.
It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
64
The Commissioner assumes a most difficult burden in proving fraudulent
evasion of tax. Generally it is difficult to prove evasion by a single act; hence,
the court must examine all of the taxpayer's acts. The process was described
by the Tax Court as follows:
[I]nvolving as it does the personal intent of the taxpayer and
intent being a state of mind, seldom can one act be singled out and
pointed to as evidencing such fraudulent intent. Rather, it is usually
found by surveying the whole course of conduct of the taxpayer.
Thus, whether a fraudulent intention is held by a taxpayer at a given
time is a fact to be gleaned, as any other fact, from all the evidence of
record and inferences properly to be drawn therefrom. 65
It can be readily seen why a decision based on the record as a whole,
finding as a fact fraudulent intent on the part of the taxpayer, 'is extremely
difficult to reverse in a court of appeals. The Supreme Court in Holland v.
United States,66 a criminal tax evasion case, held that an inference of wilfulness
can be supported where there is "evidence of a consistent pattern of under-
reporting large amounts of income and of the failure on petitioners' part to
include all of their income in their books and records." 67 The finding of a
consistent pattern of under-reporting large amounts of income has since been
used by the Tax Court many times to find fraudulent intent.
68
In Holland the Supreme Court evaluated the "net-worth" method, one of
the methods used by the IRS to find large amounts of unreported income. The
Supreme Court indicated the net-worth method is so wrought with danger
for the innocent that its use must be continually scrutinized. Contrary to the
"specific omission" case, where items omitted from taxable income are
directly pinpointed, the net-worth case employs circumstantial evidence.
69
The dangers inherent in the use of this method of ascertaining taxable income
63. E.g., Powell v. Grandquist, 252 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1958); Rea M. Gano,
19 B.T.A. 518 (1930) ; Mark A. Bird, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 384 (1962) ; Benjamin
Kann, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1526 (1961).
64. Id. at 1529.
65. Sam Goldberg, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1207, 1300 (1954).
66. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
67. Id. at 139.
68. E.g., Nathan Bilsky, 31 T.C. 35, 43 (1958) ; David H. Schultz, 30 T.C. 256, 276
(1958).
69. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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become apparent with a discussion of its operation. After the Government
concludes that the taxpayer's records are inadequate for purposes of reporting
taxable income, it establishes the taxpayer's net worth, or total value of assets
at the beginning of a given year. This procedure is repeated for each succeed-
ing year in issue. The taxpayer's nondeductible expenditures, as ascertained
by the revenue agent or special agent, including living expenses, are added
to the net-worth increases for each year. If the resulting figure for any year
is substantially greater than the taxable income reported by the taxpayer,
the Commissioner may claim the excess represents unreported taxable income.
The Commissioner adds to the deficiency the fifty-per-cent fraud penalty.
The basic assumption in such a case is that the assets are derived from taxable
sources. This method first appeared in cases involving known criminals
where all other efforts to ascertain income failed. Two of the most celebrated
cases using the net-worth method were Capone v. United States70 and United
States v. Johnson.7' The Commissioner often uses this method today in
routine cases even though the Supreme Court has questioned its use in such
cases saying, "The net worth method, it seems, has evolved from the final
volley to the first shot in the Government's battle for revenue, and its use in
the ordinary income bracket cases greatly increases the chances for error.
'72
The taxpayer's defense in net-worth cases is usually the "cash hoard," or
a buildup of large sums of cash kept hidden for various reasons and not
expended until the period in question. The taxpayer usually establishes when
the hoard was accumulated. It is normal for the alleged hoard to have been built
up over many years which makes the hoarding difficult to prove or disprove.
Nontaxable sources of such hoarded cash may be, for example, gifts, in-
heritances, or loans. 73 As the burden to prove fraud is on the respondent,
he must prove the buildup in net worth and negate the explanation of the
taxpayer as to alleged nontaxable sources of cash.
74
The respondent must also prove a likely source of the net-worth in-
creases. If the taxpayer is in a business and if the income shown by the books
and records is a fraction of what the business is shown to be capable of
earning, the respondent's burden will be more easily met. In determining
wilfulness in a criminal tax evasion case, the Supreme Court has said that
when no books and records are kept, evasion may be inferred from that fact
70. 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931).
71. 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
72. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 126 (1954).
73. Id. at 127.
74. "When the Government rests its case solely on the approximations and cir-
cumstantial inferences of a net worth computation, the cogency of its proof depends
upon its effective negation of reasonable explanations by the taxpayer inconsistent with
guilt." Id. at 135.
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coupled with the understatement of income.75 Where books and records
appear correct on their face, however, such an inference from the net-worth
increases alone may be unjustified, assuming the circumstances surrounding
the deficiency are as consistent with innocent mistake as with wilful violation
of the tax laws. The use of the net-worth method is an area where innocent
taxpayers can fall prey to the fraud penalty and where the Commissioner
must be especially careful in the assertion of such penalty.
In the Holland case the taxpayer asked the Court to restrict the net-
worth method to situations where the taxpayer has kept no books. The basis
for the argument was that the Internal Revenue Code states that net
income should be computed in accordance with the methods of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer or, if such method
does not clearly reflect income, under a method that in the opinion of the
Commissioner does so. 7 6 The Supreme Court said that the provision refers
to methods such as cash receipts or accrual and that the net-worth method
is not a method of accounting. It held, "Certainly Congress never intended
to make § 41 a set of blinders which prevents the Government from looking
beyond the self-serving declarations in a taxpayer's books."7 7 Thus, the
Supreme Court approved of the Commissioner's use of the net-worth method
although the taxpayer keeps books but not without certain admonitions about
the danger of its improper use.
7 8
In net-worth cases, once the respondent has met his burden of proof
by negating possible nontaxable sources and proving a probable tax source,
the burden of disproving the assessment should fall upon the petitioner.
Assuming there was a buildup in net worth over the years, the petitioner
would have to prove where and how it occurred. In many cases the buildup
has been kept well hidden by the petitioner, which limits the number of his
witnesses. The issue in most net-worth cases turns upon the credibility of
the petitioner as evidenced by his demeanor on the witness stand.79
The use of unexplained bank deposits is another major method utilized
by the Commissioner where books and records fail.80 The bank deposit
method is based upon the assumption that large amounts of money deposited
in a given year which are over and above the amount of taxable income
reported are derived from taxable sources. As in net-worth cases, unless the
75. Id. at 130.
76. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446.
77. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 132 (1954).
78. "While sound administration of the criminal law requires that the net worth
approach-a powerful method of proving otherwise undetectable offenses-should not
be denied the Government, its failure to investigate leads furnished by the taxpayer
might result in serious injustice." Id. at 135.
79. Bessie Brouse Nelson, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1100 (1961).
80. E.g., A. W. Minyard, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 951 (1947).
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Commissioner alleges fraud, the burden of disproving that the source of
the deposit is taxable will be entirely on the petitioner.8 1 Clear proof by the
Commissioner is required as to the taxable sources of the money in order to
sustain the fraud penalty. The Tax Court has held, "A mere showing that
currency deposited in the bank came from a safe-deposit box is not of itself
proof that the money was subject to taxation in the year during which it
was deposited.
's2
The principal point of litigation with this method, as well as with the
net-worth method, is the possible nontaxable sources of the money. Where
the taxpayer can establish that substantial deposits came from nontaxable
sources, the Commissioner will not succeed with the unexplained-bank-deposits
method.8 3 As in net-worth cases, it is more difficult in this case for the Com-
missioner to use the bank deposit method where the taxpayer keeps books
that appear to adequately reflect the taxpayer's income.
The death of the taxpayer prior to the trial of a civil fraud case has no
legal effect on the assertion of the fraud penalty because the penalty
is compensatory, not punitive.8 4 Under a special ruling issued August
24, 1945, the Commissioner may, however, depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case, decline to enforce the fraud penalty.8 5 If the
Commissioner wishes to proceed with the action, the estate is liable for any
deficiency plus penalties.8 6 In Benjamin Kann,8 7 petitioner died prior to the
trial, and no one represented the estate at the trial. The Commissioner then
moved that the case be dismissed for lack of prosecution with respect to the
deficiencies and that the court enter a decision for the Commissioner. The
court denied the motion, stating that it was not divested of jurisdiction even
though the petitioner had died, and no personal representative had been ap-
pointed for the estate, as the petition and reply to the Commissioner's answer
were duly filed.88 The reply denied the allegations of fraud and pleaded the
statute of limitations. Thus, the Commissioner was put to his burden of proof.8 9
81. Id. at 955. In both net-worth and bank deposit cases, it must be remembered,
however, that where the years in question are not "closed" by the three-year statute
of limitations, the burden of disproving the deficiencies will be squarely on the petitioner
even if the Commissioner does allege fraud but does not succeed in his burden as to the
fraud penalty. Id. at 959.
82. Id. at 960. This situation would be particularly true where the safe-deposit
box had been in use for a long period of time.
83. Murray Glackman, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1132 (1951); Pearl H. Jackson,
7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 507 (1948).
84. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
85. 4 CCH 1945 STAND. FED. TAx REP. J 6300.
86. A. Diamond, 194CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1477 (1960).
87. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1526 (1961).
88. Id. at 1528.
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After the Commissioner had submitted his evidence the court held that he
had not sustained the burden and decided for the deceased petitioner.
Many times in the trial of a civil fraud case, a question arises as to
the effect of a prior criminal tax-evasion prosecution against the same tax-
payer for the same years. The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Mitchell9 0 held
that where a taxpayer was acquitted in a criminal action for attempting to
evade taxes the Commissioner was not barred from asserting the fraud penalty
in a civil action. The petitioner asserted collateral estoppel and double jeopardy,
but both arguments were dismissed by the Court.91 In regard to collateral
estoppel the Court held that the difference in the degrees of proof in criminal
and civil cases precludes the application of the doctrine of res judicata, as the
burden in the criminal cases is beyond a reasonable doubt and in civil tax fraud
cases, clear and convincing proof.
9 2
The rationale of the Supreme Court in Mitchell has been applied by the
Tax Court to situations where the taxpayer was convicted of criminal tax
evasion and subsequently the Commissioner asserted that the taxpayer Was
collaterally estopped from defending against the fraud penalty in the Tax
Court. In Meyer J. Safra,93 the Tax Court cited Mitchell and held that if the
petitioner were to be estopped from litigating the civil fraud penalty after
being convicted for the criminal fraud penalty it would be inconsistent with
the holding of the Supreme Court. This appears to be a liberal view of the
Supreme Court's holding, but it has been followed in other cases by the Tax
Court.94 In a later case, Chief Judge Tietjens wrote,
We have held that the fact of the trial and conviction of a
petitioner is not to be deemed conclusive in a civil suit arising out
of the same matter but is evidence to be given weight according to the
circumstances. 95
Even though a conviction after trial for criminal tax evasion cannot of
itself sustain the burden of proof for the Commissioner in a civil fraud case,
it has been held that a plea of guilty in a criminal tax-evasion case without
89. Id. at 1528. When petitioner does not appear at his own trial, the Commissioner
must still sustain his burden of proof where fraud is asserted; however, a presumption
may arise in favor of the Commissioner as the result of the failure of the petitioner to
testify in his own behalf. Ibid.
90. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
91. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401-05.
92. Ibid.
93. 30 T.C. 1028 (1958).
94. Clarence Wood, 37 T.C. 70, 78 (1961) ; Rudolf A. ivnuska, 33 T.C. 220, 240
(1961).
95. Homer L. Blackwell, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 599, 618 (1961).
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further explanation is sufficient to establish civil fraud.96 Such pleas are
admissions against interest and without further explanation as to the cir-
cumstances surrounding them are sufficient to establish fraud with intent
to evade tax.
97
In civil fraud cases, the failure of the taxpayer to testify on his own
behalf will raise a presumption that the facts he might have testified to would
have been resolved against him ;98 this is unlike a criminal fraud case where
no presumption arises if the taxpayer does not wish to testify. There are
times in Tax Court proceedings where the taxpayer may refuse to testify
on the strength of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.99
To invoke the privilege there must be a possibility of future criminal prosecu-
tion in connection with the testimony he is asked to give.100 This failure to
testify, however, will not help his cause. If the taxpayer has previously
been prosecuted for criminal tax evasion, he cannot refuse to testify in a civil
fraud case where the testimony involves facts which would tend to prove
him guilty of criminal tax evasion for the year for which he was already
prosecuted.' 0 ' Where the taxpayer testifies as to matters in his own behalf
on direct examination, the Supreme Court has held that his privilege is waived
on cross-examination as to matters he made relevant on direct examination.
°0 2
Taxpayer's counsel should thus be careful not to open up any doors to
incriminating evidence on direct examination.
In a fraud case Government agents are frequently important witnesses.
Their direct testimony will disclose the results of their exhaustive investigations,
and their vast findings are generally reduced to schedules and, as such, are
introduced into evidence. It is good practice (often mandatory) that the services
of an accountant be obtained by petitioner's counsel during the examination
of the Government agents. When voluminous schedules are put into evidence
by the agents, it is always important to have an immediate professional
evaluation of their relevance and effect on the issues of the case.
Often in fraud cases problems arise in areas covered by the "best
evidence" rule. These problems are usually solvable prior to trial by effective
stipulation of the parties. Stipulation as to the problems also assists counsel
in the preparation of their cases, because it enables them to examine documents
96. Marcus Siegal, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 129 (1956).
97. Ibid.
98. Max Cohen, 9 T.C. 1156 (1947), aff'd, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949).
99. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). The privilege against self-
incrimination applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings.
100. United States v. Molasky, 118 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1941).
101. If no other years are involved in a civil fraud case than the years the taxpayer
was convicted for criminal fraud, there is no possibility that a taxpayer will incriminate
himself because he cannot be tried twice for the same offense.
102. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1957).
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at the pre-trial stage which are otherwise not seen until their introduction.
Pursuant to the rules of the Tax Court, the rules of evidence applicable in
trials without a jury in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia apply in the Tax Court.10 3 Thus, counsel should not be lulled into
thinking, as the result of the informal conferences held before the trial, that
the trial will be an informal proceeding. It is an adversary proceeding in
every sense and counsel should be fully prepared.
After both parties have rested their case, the court will set a date for
the filing of briefs. The Tax Court brief is in effect an argument and summa-
tion enabling full comment on cogent evidence by respective counsel. Dates
for briefs are usually set from thirty to sixty days hence, and it is good
practice to request the maximum time that may be needed rather than to apply
for leave to file late.
DECISION AND APPEAL
In cases where the issues are for the most part factual in nature, the
judge sitting at the trial will decide the case, and the decision will be deemed
a memorandum decision.' 0 4 Cases involving important questions of law
will be passed on by all of the Tax Court judges. The Chief Judge may
decide the case is appropriate for such treatment, or the judge who originally
heard the case may request it.105 Upon decision tax computations are made and
entered under rule 50.106
Petition for review by a United States court of appeals must be filed
within three months after the decision of the Tax Court is rendered 10 7 or
that decision becomes final.' 08 The court of appeals where the district director's
office to which the tax return in issue was filed has jurisdiction, or if no
return was filed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
jurisdiction. 1' 9 The taxpayer and counsel for the Government may, however,
stipulate to the jurisdiction of any other court of appeals. n 0 Under the
Judicial Code the courts of appeals are authorized to review Tax Court
decisions as they would review decisions of the district courts in actions tried
without a jury."' Thus, findings of fact as well as findings of law are
subject to appellate review.112 Between the time of the decision of the Tax
103. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 31.
104. Such decisions are not reported officially by the Tax Court but are published
privately.
105. These opinions are officially reported by the Government in the Tax Court of
the United States Reports; the dissenting opinions of the judges may be included.
106. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 50.
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7483.
108. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7481.
109. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(b).
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(b).
111. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a).
112. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482.
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Court and the outcome of an appeal, the Commissioner may assess any
deficiency found by the Tax Court. The taxpayer may stay the collection,
however, by filing with the Tax Court a bond guaranteeing the payment of
the deficiency.113 On review, the court of appeals can reverse the finding of
fact if it finds that the Tax Court was "clearly erroneous" in its findings or
that its findings were based on a substantial error of law. 114 Notwithstanding
that the Tax Court is a part of the executive branch, it has been held that a
decision of the Tax Court has the same status as the decision of a federal
district court.
15
Within ninety days after the entry of judgment by a court of appeals, a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court may be applied for. 16 The denial of
a petition for certiorari means that at least four judges did not believe the
matter in issue should come before the Supreme Court at that particular time.
Such a denial has no precedent value whatsoever. Once certiorari to the
Supreme Court is denied, the decision will become final.
113. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7485.
114. Wisconsin Memorial Park Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1958);
Gillette's Estate v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1950).
115. Wisconsin Memorial Park Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 114.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1958).
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